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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determining factors in private capital flow, differentiating foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) from other flows and emphasizing the role of financial liberalization and. Two reasons 
brought about this examination.  The first is the substantial increase in private capital flow mainly in the 
90s, not only in developed countries but also in developing ones. The second is a greater liberalization 
process in these economies. This article builds financial liberalization indicators based on political rules. 
The capital account liberalization is introduced as an explanatory variable in the model that investigates 
the determinants behind the capital flows. The resulting estimates confirm the econometric results sug-
gested by some of the literature on the subject: the size of the market and the rate of inflation are impor-
tant variables to explain the private capital flows, just like the infrastructure is relevant when it comes to 
developing nations. The positive influence of capital account liberalization on capital flows, which comes 
up in robust estimates, contrasts with the results included in the recent literature on this issue. The new 
findings are attributable to the differentiation between the types of capital flows, to the use of a proper 
liberalization indicator and to the econometric method applied. 
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1  Introduction 
Starting in the 80s, and mainly in the 90s, two facts became decisively in international re-
lations: a significant rise in private capital flows and the capital account liberalization. This proc-
ess began in developed nations and found fertile ground in developing ones. As argued by Ed-
wards (2000), it flourished in the 90s when market-oriented reforms were implemented. At the 
same time capital flows increased, channeled mainly through foreign direct investment (FDI). 
According to Froot (1993), worldwide flows of FDI increased almost threefold between 1980 and 
1990.  
Considering a sample of 19 developed nations, the flows of FDI as a percentage of GDP 
leaped from 1.2% in 1980 to 3.1% in 1990. This stream was extended into the next decade, when 
FDI flows reached 9.4% of the GDP of these economies. Other types of private capital also ex-
perienced a substantial grow in their flow in the 90s, when the share of private flow in the GDP 
bounded from 10.6% in 1990 to 32.7% in 2000
2. Looking at developing nations, it can be seen 
that flows of “official capital” also changed dramatically in the 90s. In these countries, the total 
amount of private flows in relation to GDP experienced remarkable expansion, from 6.2% in 
1990 to 17.5% in 2000
3. Data shown in Chart 1(a) illustrate this process. Following a period of 
instability of the average private capital flow, going from the first oil crisis to the debt crisis at the 
end of the 80s, the levels of investment were quite similar to those prevailing in the early 70s. 
This situation contrasts with that seen in the 90s, of period of significant growth. This aggregated 
flow however does not reflect certain economic events, like the recent financial crises
4. 
For this reason, this article took a step further in discriminating the other capital flows 
from FDI, following the discussion found in the literature regarding the unique nature of these 
flows, mainly during times of crises. Krugman (2000), for instance, developed a model to inves-
tigate the nature of capital flows in pre-crisis situations in developing nations. Among other find-
ings, this author shows that a crisis is usually followed by two types of capital flows. At the same 
time that short-term capital rapidly flees the country, FDI sees this scenario as an opportunity to 
                                                 
2 Data concerning the total private capital flow and gross foreign direct investment in relation to the gross domestic 
product, in 1995 US dollars, were obtained from the World Development Indicators 2002, published by the World 
Bank (2003). The sample was the group of countries listed in Table 1. 
3 Id ibidem. 
4 Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2001)   3 
pick up bargains in local companies. Considering a sample of 32 developing countries
5, we see 





Flows of private capital – total sample (a) and developing countries (b) 
























































































Source: World Development Indicators 2002 
 
The nature of private capital flows is present in other recent studies that seek to establish 
how precisely these flows affect economic growth, such as that of Soto (2003). The same concern 
with capital flows is seen in studies that discuss the problem of financial vulnerability through the 
analysis of the nature of private capital flow and of the effectiveness of political measures capa-
ble of controlling these flows. This line of thinking is espoused by Edwards (2000), Krugman 
(2000), Stiglitz (2000), Goldstein and Razin (2002), Lehmann (2002), Willett, Keil and Ahn 
(2002), and Fies (2003). 
                                                 
5 These countries are identified in Table 1, in the next section.  
6 Even FDI has been displaying different characteristics in the recent period because, as pointed out by the UNCTAD 
(2000) document, a good share of this flow is not greenfield investment, but rather for mergers and acquisitions.   4 
It must be pointed out that all this literature does not investigate the determining factors 
behind capital flows. Generally speaking, these articles focus only FDI determinants, at the same 
time that a limited number of recent studies in this line of work discriminate the total private 
capital flow and its relation with liberalization. This paper seeks to fill this gap by first analyzing 
the determinants behind private capital flow and its main components – FDI and portfolio in-
vestment. Second it places liberalization as a determinant behind capital flows. 
The present approach is unlike most of the literature in that it builds a liberalization indi-
cator based on political rules. This brings another unique element of this study, namely the use of 
more suitable econometric methods. The construction of this indicator sought to first minimize 
measuring problems and second create a measure of liberalization that can be developed as one of 
the determinants of capital flow, and thus allow to separate the influence of the liberalization of 
capital accounts on capital flows from that exerted by other factors. Many authors even consider 
that the term “liberalization” is better applied to rising capital flows than to the set of institutional 
and political changes that, among other factors, encourage the flow of capitals. Examples of these 
studies are Günçavdi, Bleaney and McKay (1998), Gelos and Werner (2001), Sancak (2002), and 
Forbes (2003). The findings of this article demonstrate that liberalization of capital mobility is a 
robust determinant of capital flow, in contrast with inconclusive results brought by recent litera-
ture on this issue. 
The next section shows the construction of the liberalization indicator for a sample of 51 
countries, from 1970 to 2000. The third section brings the empirical model and the data used in 
the analysis. The fourth section deals with the estimation of capital flow determinants. This is 
followed by concluding remarks in the last section.  
2  The capital account liberalization indicator 
Economic liberalization can be understood as the freedom resident agents have in taking 
decisions in operations with non resident agents. From this perspective, liberalization indices 
must measure the degree of government neutrality in relation to economic transactions of the 
country with other countries. In the literature
7 the liberalization process is measured by “result” 
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indicators as well as political rules indicators. In the first case, ratios such as the flow of capital as 
a percentage of the GDP are taken as measures of liberalization. In the second case, indicators are 
built that seek to gauge the degree of liberalization achieved as the result of governmental poli-
cies. 
In the case of “result” indicators, although the approach uses the flow of capital in the 
economy, it is not possible to evaluate its determinants with any degree of precision. If there is, 
say, a high liquidity in the international market, the rising flow will not reflect necessarily a shift 
in policy at the country of destination. Even if such changes in policies do occur, it is necessary 
to check the intention in relation to the result. Considering we are dealing with macroeconomic 
stabilization policies – tax reforms, for example – their primary purpose is not a rise in capital 
flow, even this being a consequence. In the case of a lowering of barriers in trade and capital ac-
counts transactions, the chief aim is to encourage financial flows. Consequently, liberalization 
acts as one of the factors spurring capital flows. Thus the need to differentiate capital flows from 
policies that can affect them, measured through rule indicators. 
2.1  Procedures for building the indicator 
The liberalization indicator built in this section allows direct observation of the changes 
that took place in the policies aiming the lifting of restrictions, mainly in regard to financial 
flows, whether in the trade account or capital account. The construction followed the methodol-
ogy suggested by Quinn (1997). The liberalization index suggested by Quinn (1997) aims to in-
vestigate how the regulation of a country’s foreign accounts affects its economic variables, such 
as growth, government outlays, business taxes, and income distribution. This approach was pre-
ferred over others because it can be applied to a large group of countries, employing criteria that 
allow a more flexible defining of the degree of freedom, which in turn is closely associated to the 
relative neutrality of the policies in relation to the operation of the markets. 
A possible alternative to the above method would be the construction of a binary indicator 
that shows the presence of restrictions to current and capital transactions. This was employed by 
Rodrik (1998). It has the positive aspect of being very straightforward yet it has two serious 
shortcomings. One is the arbitrariness at the cutting point between the open and the closed 
economies; the other is the omission of the relative magnitude of the liberalization. A third option 
would be to work in the line of liberalization indicators built for Latin America – Lora (1997) and   6 
Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999). In this case however the specific evaluation criteria used 
by the respective authors are not available. The trade liberalization measure comprises the aver-
age level of tariffs and their dispersion. The international financial liberalization measure consists 
of four components: i) control of foreign investment; ii) curbs on profit and interest transfers; iii) 
controls in foreign funding; and iv) controls in capital outflow. In the case of the second compo-
nent, the general idea is quite close to that suggested in the Quinn (1997) methodology. The trade 
reform however does not consider non-tariff barriers nor regulations on how an economic agent 
can make use of the financial assets resulting from his or her operations. That is, even if the 
methodology were indeed available, the criterion used in the trade account does not allow an 
evaluation of the financial restrictions imposed on trade. 
Codification that allows to distinguish between trade liberalization and financial liberali-
zation follows a method similar to that used by other authors, attributing values to controls im-
posed under the legislation of the different countries, as shown in the Annual Report on Ex-
change Arrangements, Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), published by the IMF. The AREAER 
emphasizes the reporting of laws that affect the capacity of economic agents in undertaking inter-
national financial transactions (Quinn, 1997, p. 535).  
For the indicator built in this article, which focuses more on financial flows, the idea is to 
evaluate the relative influence on government-approved and market-mechanism transactions. The 
total indicator is placed in the interval ranging from 0 to 14 points, which is divided into three 
blocks. The first block, spanning from 0 to 2, refers to acceptance of Article VIII
8 and to the exis-
tence of terms of commitment that ease the setting of more liberal economic measures, following 
international agreements. The second block includes current transactions, including trade transac-
tions like imports (0-2) and exports (0-2), in addition to income transfers involving payments (0-
2) and collections (0-2). Consequently, the second block displays points that vary from 0 to 8. 
Lastly, the third block refers to capital transactions, with points ranging from 0 to 4, and is di-
vided into transactions that involve payment (0-2) and those relative to collections (0-2).  
The rating definition within the intervals has a common criterion and evolves discretely in 
0.5 point steps for every additional criterion reached. If the transaction demands government ap-
proval, the highest rating is 1.0. Only in the event this transaction takes place through the market 
                                                 
8 Acceptance of Article VIII means that restrictions can exist in the capital account, but not in the current account.   7 
will the rating exceed this value
9. As a general rule transactions are divided into those that de-
mand government sanction and those that do not. In the first case the rating has a further subdivi-
sion, as follows: i) if transactions are restrained or simply prohibited, the rating is nil; ii) if trans-
action approval is subject to restrictive conditions, meaning that it is not always granted, the rat-
ing steps up to 0.5; and iii) if approval is automatic, the rating reaches 1.0. In the second case, in 
which transactions do not demand official approval and take place through market instruments, 
we also have some subdivisions, namely, iv) if the transaction is taxed, the rating is 1.5; and v) if 
the transaction is not subject to any restrictions or taxes, the rating is the highest, 2.0. 
This indicator, not unlike what happens with the international financial liberalization indi-
cator proposed by Morley, Machado and Pettinnato (1999), has the disadvantage of carrying a 
certain degree of subjective evaluation regarding the effects of legislation on the actual liberaliza-
tion process, resulting in small deviations between ratings conducted by different researchers. 
This can represent a problem if the deviations between the different ratings do not follow a ran-
dom pattern. The Quinn (1997) approach is not free from another problem common to political 
and rules indicators, related to the fact that the effect of the rule can be limited by the absence of 
mechanisms for carrying out obligations. 
Regarding the advantages of this methodology, three aspects come up. The first of them, 
common to all rule indicators, is the identification of the effect of the policy. The second, specific 
to this indicator, is the source of information (AREAER), which is the same for measuring trade 
liberalization or financial liberalization. AREAER reports, for each country since 1950, legisla-
tion that regulates transactions with other countries, always using the same criteria. This brings 
time and space consistency to the underlying information for the liberalization index. The third 
advantage, also unique to this indicator, is related to the fact that the ratings are in absolute terms, 
and for maximum liberalization the grade given is 14. This characteristic
10 allows us to observe 
the behavior of the liberalization process along time for a number of countries, which can be in-
cluded in the sample independently, without having to change the whole rating process.  
                                                 
9 For a more detailed description of the restrictions considered in the rating please see Appendix 1. 
10 This means that we do not limit the degree of liberalization to the countries present in the sample. The scale is 
independent from the sample   8 
The construction of the indicator demanded the reading of 31 AREAER reports. A total of 
51 countries were rated and the investigation period spanned from 1970 to 2000. The option to 
start in 1970 was because this was the first year featuring available data on capital flow – to be 
discussed more extensively in the next section. The choice of countries was based on the sample 
provided by Quinn (1997), which listed ratings for these economies for 1973, 1982 and 1988, an 
aspect that allowed us to compare our findings with those of this author, something important in 
the critical evaluation of the first results. On the whole, 19 developed and 32 developing nations 
were chosen for study. Of the latter, 19 were Latin American economies and 13 were from other 
regions of the globe. The index, with an interval from 0 to 14, was normalized for the 0 to 1 in-
terval, to preserve the characteristic of absolute measure.
11 
Table 1.  Total sample of countries – Liberalization Indicator, 1970-2000 
Groups Countries 
Developed countries (19)  Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Great Britain, the United States. 
Developing countries (32) 
 
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Africa and Asia: South Africa, South Korea, Egypt, the Philippines, Ghana, 
Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia.  
 
2.2  The liberalization index from 1970 to 2000 
The averages, for the whole sample and for groups of countries, are shown in Table 2. All 
observations except that for 1970 are an average of a particular year and the four preceding years. 
The table shows the capital account liberalization index (CAPOPEN) and the liberalization index 
(OPENNESS), which comprises the policies relative to these economies’ current accounts. Data 
show that in these three decades practically all groups of countries liberalized their economies, to 
a higher or lower degree. Of all the countries in the sample, only Honduras and Mexico were ex-
ceptions to this rule. The 19 developed nations in the sample underwent the most intensive liber-
                                                 
11 In order to develop this rating, we had the help of many assistants, in light of the extensive documentation con-
sulted. The capital and trade accounts ratings for each country and for each year was always conducted by more than 
two individuals, to minimize possible problems in interpreting those countries’ legislation. We thank for the help of 
Mariana Fujii, Yeun Cheon, Alexander Xavier and Silvio Campos in the task of rating the 51 countries of the sam-
ple.    9 
alization processes of all countries studied, whether from an absolute or relative perspective, es-
pecially after the 80s. Nonetheless, just like their developed equivalents, Latin American coun-
tries experienced considerable liberalization, although this process somewhat leveled during the 
debt crisis in the 80s. 
Table 2. Liberalization Index, 1970-2000 
   1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Developed nations               
  CAPOPEN        2.29         2.29         2.43         2.62         3.14         3.59         3.74  
  OPENNESS         8.37         8.58         9.09         9.79        11.14        12.62        12.98  
Developing nations               
  CAPOPEN        1.94         2.02         1.97         1.85         2.05         2.70         2.96  
  OPENNESS        6.44         6.68         6.75         6.30         6.87         8.85         9.88  
Latin America               
  CAPOPEN        2.26         2.20         2.09         1.87         2.18         2.93         3.27  
  OPENNESS        7.55         7.43         7.42         6.64         7.31         9.57        10.68  
Total sampe               
  CAPOPEN        2.07         2.12         2.14         2.14         2.46         3.03         3.25  
  OPENNESS        7.16         7.39         7.62         7.60         8.46        10.25        11.04  
Source: The authors’ calculation, based on AREAER codification. 
Chart 2 illustrates this his behavior. An important aspect of the findings is that in follow-
ing the changes in the different groups of countries, we see that developing nations raise capital 
flow controls at times of debt crises, and that developed nations keep an uniform pace until the 
end of the 90s. In developing economies, especially in Latin American ones, liberalization has a 
late start, as from the half of the 80s. 
In spite of the differences found in the liberalization processes between the groups of 
countries, it is important to highlight that a convergence process took place towards higher liber-
alization among all economies, both developed and developing ones. Chart 3 shows that this 
trend was more intensive among developed countries. 
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Chart 2 





























































Convergence of the liberalization process, 1970-2000 
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3  Model and data 
The literature on capital flows centers on determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and analyzes how this can improve asset allocation and competitiveness in those countries. Dun-
ning and Narula (1996), to give an example, expand on the model suggested by Dunning (1984) 
and suggest that countries can be rated into different stages of development, according to their 
capacity to absorb or perform foreign direct investment. The authors propose a log-linear specifi-
cation in their FDI flow-analysis models, using a cross-section database for sample of 88 coun-
tries in 1992. Among factors considered important in the studies carried out by Dunning (1984) 
and Dunning and Narula (1996) are the following: endowment of natural resources
12, size of the 
markets
13 and government policies. Another important factor in properly understanding FDI 
flows was pointed out by McCulloch (1993) and by Graham and Krugman (1993), namely for-
eign-trade barriers. Lim (2001) mentions not only such barriers, but also the degree of financial 
liberalization of those economies. Based on a compilation of the recent literature on FDI determi-
nants, this author suggests that the size of the market and availability of infrastructure are like-
wise important factors. 
The size of the market, approximated by the GDP or GDP per capita, has a significant and 
positive correlation with FDI in practically all studies. Elements pertaining to infrastructure have 
a positive correlation with FDI, but to a larger degree in developing nations. The importance of 
infrastructure is also evident in the studies of Munnell (1992) and Gramlich (1994). Other factors 
deemed important in determining FDI are labor costs, fiscal incentives and institutional aspects 
related to regulatory concerns, both bureaucratic and legal. Lim (2001) shows that these factors 
appear in the literature with non-conclusive results, in particular because of the measurement 
problems. Works conducted by UNCTAD (1998) and (1999) also investigate FDI determinants 
and confirm the relevance of some of the factors mentioned before, such as market size, labor 
costs and liberalization. It is interesting to see that according to UNCTAD (1998) the gathering 
momentum of the liberalization process in the countries called attention to policies that could 
affect FDI, but which previously had not been considered important in this aspect. Examples of 
                                                 
12 Dunning and Narula (1996) conclude that the endowment of natural resources does not matter in determining 
flows, in particular the inflow of FDI.  
13 In the case of developed nations, this aspect is studied by Gosh and Wolf (2000).   12 
this are macroeconomic policies, which result in stable inflation rates, and production-structure 
organization policies, which influence the supply, organization and quality of the production re-
sources. 
The empirical model used in this paper is based on the determinants most named in the 
literature to explain three types of capital flow: total private capital flows, foreign direct invest-
ment and other private capital flows. The total private capital flows consider both inflows and 
outflows countered by fixed or variable returns. The first case includes bank loans, securities and 
other private credits. The second case contains foreign direct investment and portfolio invest-
ments
14. The use of the capital flow is justified by two reasons. The first is that it allows decom-
position of capital flows, separating FDI flows from other private capital flows. The second is 
that the use of capital flows, rather than of inflows, is justified because it is more compatible with 
the liberalization indicator, which considers restrictions to both financial inflows and outflows. 
Regarding determinants, the aim was a simple model, considering the variables found 
most significant in the literature. Consequently, market size, infrastructure availability, inflation 
rate and average education of the labor force were all included as explanatory variables. While 
the degree of liberalization does not appear with conclusive results in the literature, it was also 
included because of the availability of the new database for this variable, as shown in Section 2. 
The size of the market, considered the most robust variable in this type of specification, is 
present in the model through the GDP per worker, at constant prices (y). To reflect the quality of 
the production resources this study took into account the infrastructure conditions, based on the 
infrastructure development indicator (IDI)
15, and the education level (u), represented by the aver-
age number of years the labor force spent in school. The model also included the inflation rate 
(π), which represented an indicator of macroeconomic stability. Lastly, the degree of liberaliza-
tion is represented by the CAPOPEN liberalization indicator. The specification of the model sug-
gested is based on Dunning and Narula (1996) and related the logarithm of the capital flow per 
worker with the aforementioned explanatory variables. In this specification, the variable z repre-
sents each kind of private capital flows per worker. 
( ) it it it it it it it u IDI y CAPOPEN z ε + β + π β + β + β + β + β = ) .( ) ln( . ) ln( . ) ln( . ) .( ln 5 4 3 2 1 0      
                                                 
14 Regarding the definitions of capital flows employed in this paper, please see World Bank (2003) 
15 A detailed explanation of the construction of the Infrastructure Development Index is found in Appendix 2.   13 
In estimating the above equation, the panel data estimation was applied, which is superior 
to the cross-section analyses used by, for example, Dunning and Narula (1996). Panel data esti-
mation allows to control country effects, which arise from non-observable characteristics. This 
procedure permits to remove the bias resulting from the correlation between these characteristics 
and the explanatory variables
16. An additional problem is the possibility that a rise in capital flow 
not only be determined by per-worker output, but also influence the rise thereof, causing simulta-
neity bias. To deal with this problem, we estimated models in two stages, using as additional in-
strumental variables for product per worker their classic determinants, namely the savings rate 
and the break-even investment rate
17. 
The sample consists of the 51 countries listed in Table 1, during a period spanning from 
1970 to 2000. For each of the countries seven observations were used, with five-year intervals, 
namely 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. Therefore, the panel dataset has an 51 
observations for each of 7 periods. According to the econometric protocol adopted, for each of 
the three dependent variables – total private capital flow, FDI flow and other private capital flows 
– seven regressions were performed. They were: (1) ordinary least squares (OLS) with pooled 
data, without including the liberalization indicator; (2) ordinary least squares (OLS) with pooled 
data, including the liberalization index; (3) fixed-effects model; (4) random-effects model; (5) 
two-stage model with pooled data; (6) two-stage fixed effects model; and (7) two-stage random 
effects model. This analysis allows us to identify the effects on estimators of different economet-
ric techniques, which supplies valuable information regarding the occurrence of problems such as 
omission bias and simultaneity. 
It should be pointed out that in the fixed-effects model, estimations are calculated based 
on the differences existing in each country along the time period, considering then the R
2 within 
this group. In the random-effects model, estimations include information not only about the dif-
ferences observed in the countries, but also along the time period, thus generating more efficient 
parameters. In this case we take the total R
2, which considers not only intra-group but also inter-
group variations
18. The random-effects model is consistent only if the country-effects are not re-
lated to other explanatory variables. The correlation between the country effects and the inde-
                                                 
16 For some considerations on panel estimates, please see, for example, Greene (2000), Wooldridge (2002) and Islam 
(1995). 
17 In this regard please see Temple (1999).  
18 Some considerations regarding this problem are found in Forbes (2000).   14 
pendent variables, as well as the presence or nonpresence of systematic differences between ran-
dom and fixed-effect estimators, is evaluated using the Hausman test. The nil hypothesis of the 
test is that no significant differences exist between parameters estimated using fixed effects and 
those using random effects, and the computed value of the statistics is compared to the critical 
value of a chi-square distribution. If the hypothesis is rejected, there is a systematic difference 
that requires the inclusion of an omitted variable control, which is the fixed country effect. 
The date were extracted from World Development Indicators 2002, published by the 
World Bank (2003), except education, which was provided by Barro and Lee (1996), and the 
CAPOPEN liberalization indicator, built using the methodology shown in second section of this 
paper. The original data for private capital flows and FDI flows, in current US dollars, were con-
verted into constant 1995 dollars, using the same GDP deflation procedure. The data were then 
divided according to the number of workers (approximated using working-age population). This 
resulted in another variable “other private capital flows”, by subtracting FDI from the total pri-
vate capital flow. “Other private capital flows” considered only observations with valid FDI val-
ues. The variables are in logarithm form. 
Regarding explanatory variables, after 1975 the liberalization indicator is the simple ar-
ithmetical average for the five preceding years, including the period observed. In regard to this 
variable, normalization was used in the interval from 0 to 1, in which 1 shows the greatest possi-
ble degree of liberalization. In addition to the liberalization indicator, an infrastructure develop-
ment indicator
19 was also built, which after 1975 also considers the simple arithmetical average 
of the five preceding years, including the period observed. The GDP per worker is stated in 1995 
US dollars. In light of available information, inflation figures were based on the implicit GDP 
deflator. After 1970 the data consider the geometrical average of the five preceding years, includ-
ing the period observed. The data are also expressed in natural logarithms. Lastly, average educa-
tion of the workforce is represented by the average number of years of education of individuals 
aged 15 and over. 
To obtain instrumental variables for the GDP per worker, the savings rate and break-even 
investment rate were also included. Savings rate was obtained from the simple average of the 
previous 20 years of domestic saving rates. Since World Bank (2003) data are available only after 
                                                 
19 The methodology for building this indicator is detailed in Appendix 2.   15 
1960, for 1970 the simple average of the previous 10 years was used and for 1975 that of the pre-
vious 15 years. These data are also in natural logarithms. The break-even investment rate is the 
sum of population growth (geometric average of the previous five years), the depreciation rate 
(3% p.a.) and the technical progress rate (2% p.a.) constant in time and equal for all countries in 
the sample. Table 3 summarizes the statistics of the variables used. 
Table 3. Summary statistics, 1970-2000 
Variable Average  Standard 





Total flow of private capital per worker  (1995 US$ ln)  6.530  2.059  -0.844  11.733  283 
FDI flow per worker (1995 US$ ln)  4.912  2.111  -3.190  10.295  270 
Other private capital flow per worker   (1995 US$ ln)  6.342  1.975  -0.945  11.554  270 
Explanatory 
Capital account liberalization indicator    –    (CAPOPEN)  0.616 0.233 0.175  1.000  357 
GDP per worker (ln - US$ 1995) –  ln(y)  8.858 1.340 5.935  11.148  357 
Infrastructure development indicator (ln) – ln(IDI) -2.385  1.462  -7.713  -0.108  322 
Inflation rate (ln) – ln(π)  2.240 1.195  -1.084  7.742  353 
Average education of the workforce – (u)  6.275 2.490 1.480  12.050  356 
Savings rate (ln)  –  ln(s)  2.997 0.355 1.260  3.597  344 
Break-even rate (ln of %) – ln(n + g + d)  -2.732 0.148  -3.061 -2.444  357 
Sources: World Bank(2003) and Barro and Lee (1996). 
4  The determinants of capital flows 
This section presents the estimations of the influence of the above variables on the capital 
flows. First, the results of the estimations of the determinants of the three types of capital flows 
for the whole sample of countries are presented. Then the results for the different groups of coun-
tries are analyzed, namely: developed nations, developing nations and Latin America.  
Estimations for the total sample of countries 
Table 4 shows the estimations of the determinants of the private capital flows. The regres-
sion (1) shows that the GDP per worker, infrastructure and inflation are significant and have the 
expected sign. The liberalization indicator is positive and significant in estimations using OLS 
with pooled data (2) and fixed effects (3), the most suitable in this case according to the Hausman 
test. In the latter, the GDP per worker and education are also positive and significant. In the two-
stage estimation, which deals with the possible simultaneity bias, the coefficients associated to   16 
the degree of liberalization, to GDP per worker, to infrastructure and to the education are all posi-
tive and significant in the random-effects model, the most suitable in this case. 
Table 4. Determinants of total private capital flow, 1970-2000 
 With  liberalization 
 
Two stages – with liberalization 
Pool Pool  Fixed  effects  Random 
effects 
 
Pool Fixed  effects  Random 
effects 
Total private  
capital flow 
  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)    (5) (6)  (7) 
CAPOPEN    2.0395***  1.6140***  1.9898***   1.9748***  1.6793***  1.8068*** 
    (0.2842)  (0.3802)  (0.3132)    (0.2964)  (0.4038)  (0.3626) 
GDP per worker – ln(y) 0.8373***  0.9453***  1.7172***  0.8927***   0.7597***  0.3746  0.5554** 
 (0.1140)  (0.1057)  (0.3139)  (0.1208)    (0.2218)  (0.7619)  (0.2793) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI) 0.3795***  0.1664  0.0785  0.1904*   0.3243  0.2615  0.3905** 
 (0.1165)  (0.1110)  (0.1380)  (0.1156)    (0.1984)  (0.1751)  (0.1942) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.1515***  -0.0387  -0.0081  -0.0454   -0.0492  -0.0851  -0.0675 
 (0.0493)  (0.0480)  (0.0608)  (0.0516)    (0.0493)  (0.0759)  (0.0551) 
Education – (u)  0.0552  0.0370  0.1800**  0.0890   0.0433  0.2375**  0.1197** 
 (0.0408)  (0.0376)  (0.0881)  (0.0549)    (0.0385)  (0.0961)  (0.0600) 
No. of observations.  276  276  276  276     273  273   273  
Adjusted R
2    0.808  0.838  0.541  0.840    0.837  0.502  0.832  
Hausman test           12.99           2.66  
Note:   The number in parentheses represent standard deviation of the estimators, significant at 1% (***), at 5% (**) and at 10% (*). 
In the adjusted R
2 , we considered the intra-group value in the fixed-effects model and the total value in the random-effects 
model. 
Table 5. Determinants of the foreign direct investment (FDI), 1970-2000 
 With  liberalization 
 
Two stages – with liberalization 
Pool Pool  Fixed  effects  Random 
effects 
 
Pool Fixed  effects  Random 
effects 
  
Foreign direct  
investment (FDI) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)  (7) 
CAPOPEN    1.8207***  1.8493***  2.2169***   1.7578***  1.8857***  2.1093*** 
    (0.3538)  (0.4912)  (0.4000)    (0.3678)  (0.5044)  (0.4538) 
GDP per worker – ln(y) 0.4298***  0.5365***  2.0128***  0.5656***   0.4171  1.1699  0.4058 
 (0.1365)  (0.1318)  (0.4181)  (0.1522)    (0.2720)  (1.0078)  (0.3385) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI) 0.7350***  0.5440***  0.3617**  0.5188***   0.6469***  0.4918**  0.6203** 
 (0.1383)  (0.1370)  (0.1737)  (0.1461)    (0.2407)  (0.2154)  (0.2426) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.2953***  -0.1827***  -0.2021**  -0.2240***   0.1900***  -0.2531***  -0.2298*** 
 (0.0604)  (0.0616)  (0.0810)  (0.0685)    (0.0628)  (0.0959)  (0.0712) 
Education – (u)  0.0363  0.0228  0.0907  0.0413   0.0268  0.1314  0.0541 
 (0.0483)  (0.0461)  (0.1140)  (0.0688)    (0.0468)  (0.1269)  (0.0730) 
No. of observations  263  263  263  263     260  260  260 
Adjusted R
2  0.753  0.775  0.592  0.778    0.776  0.586  0.779 
Hausman test           27.52           8.80  
Note:   The number in parentheses represent standard deviation of the estimators, significant at 1% (***), at 5% (**) and at 10% (*). 
In the adjusted R
2 , we considered the intra-group value in the fixed-effects model and the total value in the random-effects 
model.  
Table 5 shows the determinants of the foreign direct investment flow. The regression (1) 
shows they are significant and have the expected sign for the GDP per worker, infrastructure in-  17 
dicator and inflation. The introduction of the liberalization indicator presents a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient in the estimations of regressions (2) and (3). In the latter, a fixed-effects esti-
mation, we also see significant and positive GDP per worker and infrastructure indicator. Infla-
tion is significant with a negative sign. In the two-stage estimation, the liberalization, infrastruc-
ture and inflation indicators are all significant and have the expected sign.   
Table 6 shows the determinants of other private capital flows. In regression (1) as well as 
in the two previous tables, the GDP per capita, infrastructure and inflation appear significant and 
have the expected sign. In regressions (2) and (3), the liberalization indicator is positive and has 
the expected sign, and the GDP per worker is positive and significant. In the two-stage estimation 
with random effects (7), the liberalization indicator, the GDP per worker and the infrastructure 
indicator all have positive and significant coefficients. 
Table 6. Determinants of other private capital flows, 1970-2000 
 With  liberalization 
 
Two stages – with liberalization 
Pool Pool  Fixed ef-
fects 
Random 




Other private  
capital flows 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)  (7) 
CAPOPEN    1.8269***  1.6952***  1.9665***   1.7920***  1.7903***  1.7204*** 
    (0.2999)  (0.3844)  (0.3268)    (0.3135)  (0.4168)  (0.3849) 
GDP per worker – ln(y) 0.9071***  1.0141***  2.4234***  1.0921***   0.8971***  0.6240  0.6577** 
 (0.1178)  (0.1117)  (0.3272)  (0.1281)    (0.2319)  (0.8328)  (0.3008) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI) 0.3173***  0.1256  -0.0443  0.0954   0.2233  0.1871  0.3308* 
 (0.1194)  (0.1162)  (0.1359)  (0.1185)    (0.2052)  (0.1780)  (0.1964) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.1739***  -0.0609  0.0476  -0.0257   -0.0676  -0.0498  -0.0542 
 (0.0521)  (0.0522)  (0.0634)  (0.0556)    (0.0536)  (0.0793)  (0.0596) 
Education – (u)  0.0163  0.0028  0.0298  0.0292   0.0063  0.1295  0.0745 
 (0.0417)  (0.0391)  (0.0892)  (0.0593)    (0.0399)  (0.1049)  (0.0663) 
No. of observations  263  263  263  263     260  260  260 
Adjusted R
2  0.788  0.814  0.530  0.817   0.813  0.463  0.809 
Hausman test           20.59           0.21  
Note:   The number in parentheses represent standard deviation of the estimators, significant at 1% (***), at 5% (**) and at 10% (*). 
In the adjusted R
2 , we considered the intra-group value in the fixed-effects model and the total value in the random-effects 
model.  
The estimation using OLS with pooled data – which is closer to cross-section estimations, 
more common in the literature – omits some important results regarding the explanatory variables 
and the magnitude of the liberalization coefficient. In relation to the explanatory variables, all 
estimations made using the OLS with pooled data presented the same variables as determinants to 
explain the three types of capital flows. The introduction of the liberalization indicator and the 
use of other estimation techniques show that explanatory variables are not the same for all types   18 
of capital flows. In the case of the total capital flow, inflation does not appear as a relevant vari-
able, in spite of being so for the FDI flow. In the case of the other private capital flows, only lib-
eralization and the size of the market are always relevant explanatory variables. The size of the 
market is in most of the regressions a relevant variable to help explain the private capital flows. 
In relation to the liberalization indicator, its coefficient is positive and significant in all regres-
sions, which shows the importance of the liberalization process on private capital flows. This 
result demonstrates that omitting the liberalization process does indeed affect estimations. 
Regarding the magnitude, the liberalization indicator for other private capital flows ap-
pears slightly above in relation to the indicator for FDI flows, when estimating using OLS with 
pooled data. However, estimations using panel techniques show a greater magnitude of the liber-
alization indicator for the FDI flows, indicating the relatively larger importance of liberalization 
in the flow of this type of capital. 
Estimations per groups of countries 
Table 7 shows the analysis of the determinants of private capital flows for three groups of 
countries. In the case of developed nations, the liberalization indicator, GDP per worker and in-
flation rate are all significant in regression (2). In the estimation using the fixed-effects model, 
liberalization and GDP per worker have positive and significant coefficients and the infrastruc-
ture indicator is significant, yet has a negative sign. In the two-stage fixed-effects estimation, the 
liberalization indicator and the GDP per worker remain positive and significant, while the infra-
structure indicator does not appear with a significant coefficient. 
For developing nations, in regression (2) the liberalization indicator, GDP per worker and 
the education of the workforce are all relevant in determining private capital flows. In the ran-
dom-effects model, in addition to the above variables, we also see the infrastructure indicator. In 
the estimation using the two-stage random-effects model all variables but the GDP per worker are 
shown significant and have the expected sign. For Latin America, in regression (2) we have the 
same explanatory variables found for developing nations. In regressions (3) and (7) however edu-
cation is no longer found, and only the liberalization indicator and the size of the market are posi-
tive and significant.   19 
Table 7. Groups of countries: Determinants in total private capital flow, 1970-2000 
 With  liberalization 
 
Two stages – with liberalization 
Pool Pool  Fixed ef-
fects 
Random 




Total private capital flow 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)  (7) 
Developed nations                 
CAPOPEN    1.8697***  2.2171***  2.4575***   1.8780***  2.3147***  2.5747*** 
    (0.4659)  (0.5552)  (0.4901)    (0.4785)  (0.5875)  (0.5166) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  1.1748***  1.2570***  4.3727***  2.1962***   0.6555  4.6462***  2.1291** 
  (0.3275)  (0.3077)  (0.7169)  (0.4511)    (0.5622)  (1.7128)  (1.0401) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.4431  0.1570  -0.6509*  0.0255   0.4135  -0.7670  0.0055 
  (0.2954)  (0.2860)  (0.3680)  (0.3114)    (0.3808)  (0.6513)  (0.4735) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.5545***  -0.3201***  -0.0785  -0.1293   0.4379***  -0.0690  -0.1315 
  (0.1263)  (0.1321)  (0.0996)  (0.1039)    (0.1598)  (0.1073)  (0.1083) 
Education – (u)  -0.1008*  -0.0819  -0.1333  -0.0765   -0.0797  -0.1542  -0.0553 
  (0.0599)  (0.0564)  (0.1083)  (0.0788)    (0.0577)  (0.1457)  (0.0961) 
No. of observations  115  115  115  115     113  113  113 
Adjusted R
2   0.552  0.606  0.791  0.610    0.600  0.790  0.616 
Hausman test           16.80           38.92  
Developing nations             
CAPOPEN    1.6522***  0.6338  1.1505***    1.5309***  0.3599  0.9271** 
    (0.3574)  (0.5210)  (0.4113)    (0.3736)  (0.5668)  (0.4548) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  0.9447***  1.0148***  0.7597*  0.9490***    0.7014**  -0.1192  0.6448 
  (0.1475)  (0.1395)  (0.4091)  (0.1712)    (0.3387)  (0.8350)  (0.4190) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.3388***  0.1707  0.3500*  0.2372*    0.3561  0.5605**  0.3621* 
  (0.1232)  (0.1214)  (0.2007)  (0.1343)    (0.2166)  (0.2635)  (0.1996) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.0969*  -0.0288  -0.0152  -0.0105    -0.0133  -0.0670  -0.0073 
  (0.0556)  (0.0543)  (0.0741)  (0.0585)    (0.0577)  (0.0894)  (0.0597) 
Education – (u)  0.1776***  0.1529***  0.1407  0.1563**    0.1757***  0.1035  0.1739** 
  (0.0578)  (0.0546)  (0.1384)  (0.0761)    (0.0592)  (0.1447)  (0.0827) 
No. of observations  161  161  161  161     160  160  160 
Adjusted R
2   0.683  0.719  0.354  0.724    0.711  0.324  0.716 
Hausman test           4.22           3.95  
Latin America                 
CAPOPEN    1.2385***  1.5290***  1.3700***    1.2432***  1.3464**  1.2994*** 
    (0.3762)  (0.5098)  (0.4261)    (0.3963)  (0.5892)  (0.4627) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  0.7352***  0.8248***  0.8584*  0.9553***    0.9786**  -1.1854  0.9135** 
  (0.1652)  (0.1595)  (0.4988)  (0.1989)    (0.3843)  (1.4022)  (0.4515) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.2823*  0.1517  0.2764  0.1109    0.0879  0.5348**  0.1258 
  (0.1428)  (0.1415)  (0.1951)  (0.1510)    (0.2132)  (0.2662)  (0.1839) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.1902***  -0.1107  -0.0144  -0.0448    -0.1168**  -0.1270  -0.0457 
  (0.0537)  (0.0565)  (0.0665)  (0.0568)    (0.0581)  (0.1044)  (0.0574) 
Education – (u)  0.2144***  0.1811***  -0.1828  0.0874    0.1726**  -0.3399*  0.0947 
  (0.0686)  (0.0660)  (0.1446)  (0.0875)    (0.0702)  (0.1878)  (0.0922) 
No. of observations  99  99  99  99     98  98  98 
Adjusted R
2   0.600  0.638  0.323  0.640    0.637  0.151  0.646 
Hausman test           13.46           9.15  
Note:   The number in parentheses represent standard deviation of the estimators, significant at 1% (***), at 5% (**) and at 10% (*). 
In the adjusted R
2 , we considered the intra-group value in the fixed-effects model and the total value in the random-effects 
model.    20 
These results detail the findings for the aggregated sample of countries. The liberalization 
of the capital account is an important factor for all groups of countries. The size of the market, 
while not significant for developing nations in the two-stage estimation, has a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient for all other regressions. As pointed out previously, this demonstrates that 
there is a problem of simultaneous determination between the GDP and capital flows, mainly in 
the group of developing nations. Lastly, it should be pointed out that infrastructure conditions, as 
found in the literature, and education of the workforce are significant only for the whose set of 
developing nations. 
A noteworthy aspect is that, in the final two-stage estimations for the total private capital 
flows, the liberalization indicator for developed nations has a coefficient quite above that found 
for developing nations. Even in the case of Latin America, whose coefficient is above the set of 
all developing countries, liberalization seems to have had a lesser effect than that found in devel-
oped countries. 
Table 8 presents the determinants for foreign direct investment (FDI). For developed na-
tions, regression (2) shows that the liberalization indicator, inflation rate and education have sig-
nificant coefficients. In the estimation using the fixed-effects model, the liberalization indicator 
and the inflation rate are significant and have the expected sign. In the two-stage random-effects 
estimation, the infrastructure indicator is not significant. In this estimation, the liberalization indi-
cator and the GDP per worker remain positive and significant, while the inflation rate has a nega-
tive and significant coefficient. 
In the case of developing nations, regression (2) shows that all model variables, except 
education, are significant and have the expected sign. In the random-effects model this result re-
mains unchanged. In the two-stage random-effects estimation the GDP per worker is no longer 
significant and only the inflation rate and the liberalization and infrastructure indicators remain 
significant. For Latin America regressions (2), (4) and (7) show that only liberalization and infra-
structure indicators are relevant in determining FDI flow.   21 
Table 8. Groups of countries: Determinants of FDI flow, 1970-2000 
 With  liberalization 
 
Two stages – with liberalization 
Pool Pool  Fixed ef-
fects 
Random 





ment flow (FDI) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)  (7) 
Developed nations                 
CAPOPEN    1.7508***  1.5606**  1.9685***   1.7085***  1.3460*  1.7831*** 
    (0.5686)  (0.6601)  (0.6089)    (0.5944)  (0.6999)  (0.6440) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  0.0111  0.0958  5.0058***  1.9058***   -1.0493  5.8478***  2.3940* 
  (0.3974)  (0.3836)  (0.8495)  (0.5857)    (0.7395)  (2.0334)  (1.4351) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.7314**  0.4584  -1.0902**  -0.0851   1.0336**  -1.1902  -0.1346 
  (0.3585)  (0.3564)  (0.4394)  (0.3925)    (0.5021)  (0.7785)  (0.6263) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.8061***  -0.5867***  -0.3819***  -0.4196***   
-
0.7922***  -0.3548***  -0.4128*** 
  (0.1499)  (0.1610)  (0.1181)  (0.1261)    (0.2002)  (0.1276)  (0.1303) 
Education – (u)  0.0973  0.1157*  0.0189  0.1213   0.1094  -0.0438  0.1124 
  (0.0715)  (0.0691)  (0.1289)  (0.1007)    (0.0719)  (0.1731)  (0.1278) 
No. of observations  113  113  113  113     111  111  111 
Adjusted R
2   0.537  0.570  0.763  0.539    0.548  0.794  0.525 
Hausman test           28.80           7.40  
Developing nations             
CAPOPEN    1.5314***  1.6165**  1.6482***    1.4989***  1.4637*  1.5099*** 
    (0.4605)  (0.7269)  (0.5459)    (0.4771)  (0.7808)  (0.5750) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  0.5824***  0.6646***  1.2697**  0.6766***    0.9089**  0.4216  0.5425 
  (0.1892)  (0.1846)  (0.5758)  (0.2235)    (0.4315)  (1.1624)  (0.5075) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.8148***  0.6553***  0.7172***  0.7280***    0.5303**  0.8914***  0.7802*** 
  (0.1514)  (0.1541)  (0.2700)  (0.1742)    (0.2614)  (0.3446)  (0.2556) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.2041***  -0.1343*  -0.1728  -0.1604**    -0.1524**  -0.2274*  -0.1523* 
  (0.0719)  (0.0726)  (0.1074)  (0.0815)    (0.0769)  (0.1244)  (0.0819) 
Education – (u)  -0.0890  -0.1073  -0.0941  -0.1153    -0.1210  -0.1113  -0.1013 
  (0.0715)  (0.0694)  (0.1937)  (0.0982)    (0.0746)  (0.1972)  (0.1007) 
No. of observations  150  150  150  150     149  149  149 
Adjusted R
2   0.531  0.562  0.473  0.576    0.563  0.462  0.578 
Hausman test           4.95           2.52  
Latin America                 
CAPOPEN    1.0425*  1.8306**  1.2436**    0.9820*  1.8266**  1.0769* 
    (0.5310)  (0.8472)  (0.6068)    (0.5604)  (0.9337)  (0.6406) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  0.1277  0.2069  1.1352  0.2700    0.3105  -1.6836  0.1457 
  (0.2303)  (0.2303)  (0.8409)  (0.2670)    (0.5972)  (2.9027)  (0.6033) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.9604***  0.8549***  0.7307**  0.8279***    0.8252***  1.0364**  0.8812*** 
  (0.1898)  (0.1944)  (0.3098)  (0.2113)    (0.3019)  (0.4538)  (0.2702) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.1689**  -0.0975  -0.1338  -0.1277    -0.1067  -0.2782  -0.1221 
  (0.0776)  (0.0847)  (0.1142)  (0.0886)    (0.0915)  (0.1848)  (0.0893) 
Education – (u)  0.0076  -0.0179  -0.1008  -0.0416    -0.0207  -0.2886  -0.0264 
  (0.0912)  (0.0907)  (0.2294)  (0.1147)    (0.0960)  (0.3073)  (0.1180) 
No. of observations  95  95  95  95     94  94  94 
Adjusted R
2   0.425  0.442  0.451  0.469    0.448  0.363  0.474 
Hausman test           4.91           2.67  
Note:   The number in parentheses represent standard deviation of the estimators, significant at 1% (***), at 5% (**) and at 10% (*). 
In the adjusted R
2 , we considered the intra-group value in the fixed-effects model and the total value in the random-effects 
model.    22 
The results for developing nations help identify why market size is not significant in two-
stage estimation for the whole sample of countries. A possible explanation could lie in the impor-
tance of FDI for companies whose output is targeted to foreign markets. Macroeconomic stability 
conditions, represented by the inflation rate, arise as an important variable, both for developed 
nations as well as for developing ones. In the case of the infrastructure indicator, it is not relevant 
for developed nations. To a large extent this is due to the fact that these countries already enjoy 
sound infrastructure and consequently this particular variable does not highlight considerable 
differences in these nations. Finally, it should be pointed out that liberalization affects positively 
and significantly FDI of all groups of countries. 
It is important to note that in the case of the FDI flows the effect of liberalization for de-
veloped nations is slightly above, but closer, that of, the effect for developing countries. This 
means that in the case of FDI flow, liberalization has similar effects for both developed and de-
veloping countries. 
Table 9 brings the determinants for other private capital flows. For developed nations, in 
regression (2) the liberalization indicator and the GDP per worker are significant, beyond educa-
tion, but this with opposite signs. In regressions (3) and (6), only the liberalization indicator and 
the GDP per worker are significant. For developing nations the liberalization indicator, the GDP 
per worker and education are all significant in regression (2). In regressions (3) and (7) only the 
GDP per worker and infrastructure indicator are significant. In the case of Latin America, in 
equation (2), the liberalization index, GDP per worker, inflation rate and education are all rele-
vant and have the expected sign. In regressions (3) and (7) only the liberalization indicator and 
the GDP per worker are significant. 
These results once again show the importance of good infrastructure in developing na-
tions, now as a luring aspect to other private capital flows. This fact could in part be associated to 
a parallel historical process of infrastructure privatization in most of those countries. The size of 
the market is an important variable for all groups of countries. Liberalization is not relevant in the 
final estimations for the group of developing nations, although it is important for Latin Amer-
ica.
20  
                                                 
20 In this regard please see Bandeira and Garcia (2002).    23 
Table 9. Groups of countries: Determinants of other private capital flows, 1970-2000 
 With  liberalization 
 
Two stages – with liberalization 
Pool Pool  Fixed ef-
fects 
Random ef-




Other private capital 
flows 
  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)   (5) (6)  (7) 
Developed nations                 
CAPOPEN    2.0513***  2.4207***  2.6661***   2.0360***  2.5487***  2.8067*** 
    (0.4952)  (0.6335)  (0.5331)    (0.5123)  (0.6703)  (0.5597) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  1.4338***  1.5330***  4.2526***  2.2695***   0.8501  4.2748**  1.7220* 
  (0.3573)  (0.3341)  (0.8152)  (0.4784)    (0.6374)  (1.9471)  (1.0039) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.4916  0.1717  -0.5625  0.0555   0.4938  -0.6125  0.1927 
  (0.3224)  (0.3104)  (0.4217)  (0.3430)    (0.4328)  (0.7455)  (0.5010) 
Inflation – ln(π) 
-
0.4987***  -0.2416*  -0.0043  -0.0616   -0.3683**  -0.0012  -0.0894 
  (0.1348)  (0.1402)  (0.1134)  (0.1148)    (0.1726)  (0.1222)  (0.1237) 
Education – (u) 
-
0.1852***  -0.1637***  -0.1662  -0.1405*   
-
0.1653***  -0.1709  -0.1059 
  (0.0643)  (0.0602)  (0.1237)  (0.0844)    (0.0620)  (0.1657)  (0.0955) 
No. of observations  113  113  113  113     111  111  111 
Adjusted R
2   0.520  0.582  0.737  0.590    0.572  0.736  0.593 
Hausman test           150.58           20.52  
Developing nations               
CAPOPEN    1.2007***  0.4698  0.7769*    1.0959***  0.1574  0.5440 
    (0.3552)  (0.4892)  (0.4071)    (0.3718)  (0.5461)  (0.4515) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  1.0344***  1.0989***  1.3715***  1.1613***    0.8675**  0.0714  0.8030* 
  (0.1461)  (0.1424)  (0.3875)  (0.1736)    (0.3363)  (0.8130)  (0.4167) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.2498**  0.1248  0.3637**  0.1925    0.2534  0.6353***  0.3297* 
  (0.1169)  (0.1188)  (0.1817)  (0.1302)    (0.2037)  (0.2410)  (0.1829) 
Inflation – ln(π)  -0.1241**  -0.0694  0.0278  -0.0027    -0.0558  -0.0473  0.0031 
  (0.0555)  (0.0560)  (0.0723)  (0.0599)    (0.0599)  (0.0870)  (0.0612) 
Education – (u)  0.1765***  0.1621***  -0.1066  0.0793    0.1798***  -0.1270  0.0927 
  (0.0552)  (0.0535)  (0.1304)  (0.0779)    (0.0581)  (0.1379)  (0.0862) 
No. of observations  150  150  150  150     149  149  149 
Adjusted R
2   0.691  0.712  0.335  0.706    0.707  0.269  0.705 
Hausman test           19.05           7.47  
Latin America                 
CAPOPEN    1.1407***  0.9959*  1.0925**    1.1533**  0.9566  1.0412** 
    (0.4218)  (0.5498)  (0.4719)    (0.4485)  (0.6144)  (0.5119) 
GDP per worker – ln(y)  0.9853***  1.0721***  1.0200*  1.1017***    1.2402**  -0.9725  1.0695** 
  (0.1863)  (0.1829)  (0.5457)  (0.2171)    (0.4780)  (1.9102)  (0.4988) 
Infrastructure – ln(IDI)  0.0895  -0.0259  0.2185  -0.0277    -0.0908  0.4384  0.0056 
  (0.1535)  (0.1544)  (0.2011)  (0.1622)    (0.2417)  (0.2986)  (0.1890) 
Inflation – ln(π) 
-
0.2174***  -0.1392**  0.0082  -0.0331    -0.1509**  -0.0912  -0.0178 
  (0.0628)  (0.0672)  (0.0741)  (0.0662)    (0.0733)  (0.1216)  (0.0664) 
Education – (u)  0.2534***  0.2254***  -0.2057  0.1148    0.2171**  -0.3368*  0.0802 
  (0.0738)  (0.0720)  (0.1488)  (0.0946)    (0.0768)  (0.2022)  (0.1037) 
No. of observations  95  95  95  95     94  94  94 
Adjusted R
2   0.559  0.588  0.196  0.583    0.584  0.043  0.571 
Hausman test           70.36           9.05  
Note:   The number in parentheses represent standard deviation of the estimators, significant at 1% (***), at 5% (**) and at 10% (*). 
In the adjusted R
2 , we considered the intra-group value in the fixed-effects model and the total value in the random-effects 
model.    24 
In relation to the magnitude of the liberalization indicator, this is quite higher in devel-
oped nations, particularly when compared to Latin America, say. On the other hand, when the 
same groups of countries are compared in Tables 8 and 9, a difference arises between the group 
of developed countries and that of the developing and Latin American ones. In the case of the last 
group, the effect of liberalization has greater impact on FDI than on other private capital flows, in 
line with the results found for the total private capital flow. In the case of developed nations, lib-
eralization has a much greater effect on other private capital flows than on FDI flow. 
In spite of some peculiarities, the set of estimations mostly confirms the results found in 
the literature. In first place, the size of the market, represented by the GDP per worker, played a 
major role in most equations. Second, infrastructure is of greater importance in the estimations 
for developing nations. In regard however to liberalization, estimates show more robust results: 
except for other private capital flows for developing nations, the liberalization process does in-
deed matter in explaining international capital flows. Please note that its influence is even more 
consistent than the size of the market, presented by Lim (2001) as the most important variable 
found in the literature that studies capital flow determinants. Considering that liberalization and 
capital flow affect economic growth, as argued by Garcia and Santana (2004), this discrepancy in 
the results can be explained to a large extent by omitting liberalization in the estimations, or by 
not dealing with the aspect of simultaneous determination of capital flows and economic growth. 
Regarding the magnitude of the indicator, the results show that for developed nations the 
effects of liberalization tend to be greater than those found in developing and Latin American 
ones. This happens especially because of other private capital flows, in which the effect of liber-
alization is quite higher for developed countries. This could be reflecting in the development of 
the financial markets in these economies. In the case of FDI flow, the impact of liberalization is 
similar for all groups of countries.   
5  Conclusions  
The 90s saw a substantial rise in private capital flows and the consolidation of the liber-
alization process, all of which triggered a series of studies highlighting the role of liberalization 
in the capital flows. Such studies however carry methodological problems regarding the liberali-
zation indicator. Some authors resort to dummy variables, which are not up to the task of prop-
erly representing the degree of liberalization, quite distinct among the different economies. Other   25 
authors, more interested in the effects of liberalization on economic growth, prefer to use the 
capital flows as a liberalization measure. Estimations made in this article allow to infer that capi-
tal flows as a measure of liberalization are not suitable indicators of the liberalization process, 
although they are highly correlated. This happens because even without changes in the degree of 
liberalization of an economy, capital flows can rise because of other factors, such as improving 
macroeconomic conditions of the beneficiary country.  
This article has also analyzed the determinants of private capital flows, with particular 
emphasis on the role of liberalization. The problem presented by the measure of liberalization 
was successfully addressed by building a liberalization indicator, based on government policy 
measures, and measuring the neutrality of the government in regard to the nation’s economic 
transactions with other countries. The liberalization indicator built here seems to have properly 
captured the historical process under study, because it allowed pinpointing the process of devel-
oping nations raising economic barriers in the early 80s, following the debt crisis, and the greater 
liberalization after the second half of the same decade. Estimations for capital flow determinants 
for the sample of 51 countries from 1970 to 2000 reveals the importance of capital account liber-
alization to increase the capital flows. These findings counter the literature’s inconclusive results, 
presented by Lim (2001). Liberalization has similar effects on FDI flow, for all groups of coun-
tries analyzed. In the case of other private capital flows, liberalization has a greater impact on 
developed nations. 
Finally, it should be said that the results of this article provide a warning in regard to the 
simultaneity problem existing between capital flow determination and economic growth. As dis-
cussed, estimates change considerably when the GDP per worker is instrumentalized. For this 
reason and for its intrinsic characteristics, the liberalization indicator suggested here is valuable 
as an instrument variable of capital flows and can help pinpoint more precisely the effects of  
capital mobility on economic growth, as analyzed by Garcia and Santana (2004).  
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 Appendix 1: Rating criteria used in the liberalization indicator 
In the methodology propose by Quinn (1997), the total indicator falls within an interval that 
ranges from 0 to 14 points, divided into three blocks: 
i)  Acceptance of Article VIII and other terms of commitment that ease the establishment 
of more liberal economic measures, based on international agreements, with a rating 
from 0 to 2; 
ii)  Current transactions (0 and 8), subdivided into trade transactions, such as exports (0-2) 
and imports (0-2), and income transfer, whether payments (0-2) or receipts (0-2); 
iii)  Capital transactions (0 and 4), involving ingress (0-2) and egress of assets (0-2) 
In the first group, acceptance of Article VIII gives the country a rating of 1.0. If the country is part 
of a free-trade agreement area or trade union, the rating receives an additional 0.5. If the country belongs 
to a common market or economic union, the additional rating is 1.0. Regarding the other groups, two as-
pects must be highlighted. In first place, the rating does not consider restrictions imposed for geopolitical 
reasons, or of safety, health or environmental nature. Second, the country’s rating will be null if it explic-
itly bans the trade of goods or services, or the flow of capital. In the case of the capital account, for exam-
ple, this can take place during, say, a moratorium, with the blocking of all outflows, to remunerate invest-
ments or financial capital. 
In relation to the other ratings, while the general idea is the same, there are specific aspects among 
the different groups, according to the transactions involved. In the case of the flow of goods, the rating 
will be 0.5 if the government has restrictive approval, something which can occur when i) the government 
imposes quotas to import and/or export a number of goods, ii) some kinds of goods are simply banned 
from import or export, with the government alleging that local similar products exist, if this is the case for 
various categories, iii) foreign trade by private or public companies is limited, and iv) other similar limita-
tions exist. 
In this group a rating will reach 1.0 point when government approval is practically assured and the 
above restrictions are not generalized but limited to some types of goods. The requirement that export 
revenues be surrendered to the government is a sign that this account will be rated no more than 1.0. In the 
event various foreign-exchange rates exist, the requirement to hand export revenues over to the govern-
ment can mean an additional cost of transaction, and the rating will drop to 0.5. 
Still within this group, the rating will reach 1.5 point when such restrictions are tax based and do 
not depend on direct government approval. According to the intention of the law, whether restrictive or 
supervisory, the rating in this level can remain the same, even if the government occasionally interferes in 
the flow of trade, in aspects such as i) specific surtaxes for some goods, ii) taxes for products similar to 
those produced in the country, iii) need for advance deposits, iv) need to remit revenues back home, v) 
requirement to negotiate with minimum prices, in the case of exports, and iv) requirement for a given type 
of operation financing. The rating will drop to 1.0 when some restrictions are even more strict, as is the 
case of a generalized surtax, costly advance deposit, in terms of anticipation and of value, and of the need 
to remit profits back home when multiple foreign-exchange rates exist. The rating will probably reach 2.0 
points if the law does not contain any restrictive aspects or if they are very far in between, and conse-
quently do not restrict the proper flow of trade between economies. 
In the case of the trade of services and still within the realm of current transactions, the rating will 
be around 0.5 point if the government provides any restrictive interference to approve a transaction. This 
can take place when i) quantitative limits are set to remit profits and/or interest, ii) some prohibitive cate-
gories are in place for some flows of income, and iii) other similar restrictions are set. The rating will 
reach 1.0 point when government approval is just about automatic. This takes place when i) time restric-
tions exist for income remittal, such as demanding one year before a given amount can be remitted, ii) the 
government requires some revenues to be turned over to it, iii) restrictions exist regarding the use of the 
assets obtained, and iv) other similar restrictions exist. Similarly to what happens with the transactions of 
goods, the rating will reach 1.5 point in transactions involving income when restrictions are determined by 
taxation and do not depend on direct government approval, whether on time or quantity terms. In the spe-  29 
cific case of travel or private money transfers, this rating can be maintained, even if some quotas are in 
place in regard to the values that the person can dispose. However, the rating will drop to 1.0 when trans-
actions are subject to unusually high taxing. On the other hand, the rating will reach 2.0 when likewise 
legislation does not have any restrictive elements or if they are infrequent. In the specific case of travel or 
private money transfers, this rating can remain, even if the transaction amounts are taxed. 
In the case of the third group, transactions involve inflows (IN) and outflows (OUT) of capital, 
whether productive capital, in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), or financial capital, in the form 
of loans or portfolio flows. Just like in the accounts of the second group, the rating will be determined 
according to the nature of the legislation, and the whole set of legislative rules must be analyzed. The rat-
ing will be about 0.5 point when any of the following exist: i) FDI is banned in various sectors, ii) country 
residents cannot invest abroad (OUT), iii) quantitative and time restrictions are imposed to amortize the 
capital invested in the country (OUT), iv) ownership of local companies is banned to non residents (IN), 
v) country residents cannot invest in portfolios abroad, whether in equities or bonds (OUT), vi) some 
types of loans cannot be secured abroad, whether because of the type of loan or the tenure (IN), and vii) 
non-residents are not allowed to secure loans (OUT). 
The rating will reach 1.0 point when the above limitations are not preventive in nature. This will 
take place when any of the following exist: i) any FDI in the country must be approved beforehand (IN), 
ii) previous restrictions in place for the remuneration of  production capital, such as remittances of profit 
or financial capital, namely interest, iii) FDI is restricted in some industries (IN), iv) country residents are 
subject to restrictions in foreign investment, whether FDI or portfolio application, such restrictions apply-
ing to the type of investment or agents, such as investment funds (OUT), v) time limitations to amortize 
capital invested in the country (OUT), vi) limitations regarding some types of funding, as is the case of not 
allowing loans with tenures shorter than one year (IN), and vii) some limits are set regarding the owner-
ship of local property (IN). 
The rating will reach 1.5 when transactions do not require approval to be carried out but are still 
subject to occasional restrictions. This can happen for example in the case of limiting liability exposure in 
foreign currency in relation to assets (IN) or when foreign financial institutions are subject to limitations 
OUT). The rating will reach 2.0 points when the flow of capital is practically unrestricted, allowing the 
agents to freely move their capital in search of the best investment opportunities. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Infrastructure development indicator 
Infrastructure plays an essential role in the return of investments, consequently affecting economic 
growth. The impact of this sector is significant because it provides essential resources for many other sec-
tors along the production chain. This means that any improvements in infrastructure will be felt by many 
other industries. Some studies, such as those of Munnel (1992) and Gramlich (1994), point out the impor-
tance of infrastructure in this aspect. 
The concept of economic infrastructure refers to the stock of fixed capital with reduced mobility 
and high sunk costs, indivisibility and product-capital relation, in addition to high dispersion of consump-
tion. This definition includes the electricity, telecommunications and transport infrastructures, as well as 
the whole urban infrastructure. The low mobility of this fixed capital, in particular because a non-grid 
supply is not feasible, gives infrastructure a characteristic of a specific factor of a country or region. 
This specific factor can be measured using the Infrastructure Development Index (IDI), according 
to the methodology suggested by Sanchez-Robles (1998). The IDI was inspired in the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) and uses a similar methodology. The IDI works with a weighted average of indices 
relative to each of the components or variables (j) used. The index relative to the component  j is obtained 
by normalizing the series, which range from  0 to 1. 
  Indexj = (valuej – valuemin) /  (value max – valuemin) 
Sanchez-Robles (1998) suggest the use of the amount of electricity produced the number of fixed 
telephone lines, the size of the road network and the size of the rail grid. These series must be considered   30 
on a per-capita basis and aim to allow a comparison between countries based on the actual infrastructure 
available to their inhabitants. 
In the sample used in this article, comprised of 51 countries from 1970 to 2000, the basis found in 
the World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank (2003), presented serious problems in 
regard to the availability of the data, mainly for roads, which were available generally only for the 90s, 
and rail, which were even nonexistent for some countries. In order to raise the number of observations 
within the sample, the only series considered in this study were those of electricity (kWh) and the number 
of fixed telephone lines (per 1000 inhabitants)
22. 
These two series were standardized and led to the Index of each sector j. First, the value per habi-
tant for each of the series was found. Next the aforementioned normalization took place. For some coun-
tries, an absence of data for 1999 led to a conservative assumption that the 2000 value had remained un-
changed from the previous year. 
After the j Indices for each sector were computed, the next step was to compute the IDI by taking 
the average of the above indices. This was done by attributing to each j Index a weight according to its 
component score coefficient, following the procedure suggested by Sanchez-Robles (1998). This weighing 
process aims to maximize the variance of the linear combination of the series. The component score coef-
ficients, which weigh the IDI expression, were obtained from the first component, which explains 88% of 
the variance. 
IDIit = 0,532.(IndexELECTRICITY)it + 0,532.(IndexTELEPHONE)it 
The final data are presented in Table 14. Except for 1970, all other observations represent the av-
erage of the last five years, including that of the observation. Consequently, the value presented for 1975 
corresponds to the average between 1971 and 1975. This is also true for the subsequent periods. 
The data show improvements in the infrastructure of all countries in the sample during the period 
analyzed, in particular when the end situation is compared to the initial situation (last column). Generally 
speaking, developed countries were those which had the most significant improvements. 
The data further show that a positive average development took place in infrastructure conditions. 
When we compare points where the sample is complete, we see that the indicator has an initial score of 
0.1418, in 1980, and grows to 0.2879, in 2000. A high dispersion among the countries can also be seen, as 
witnessed by the rising standard deviation, from 0.1643, in 1980, to 0.2468, in 2000. This confirms the 
assumption that the most significant improvements in infrastructure conditions took place in the more 
developed nations. 
                                                 
22 The definitions detailed in the World Development Indicators 2002, published by the World Bank (2003) are the following: 
o  Electricity produced (kWh) – This is measured at station terminals and cover all sources of energy used by power 
plants (hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear power); the series further includes power generated by solar, geother-
mal, wind and tide power sources. 
o  Number of fixed telephone lines (per 1,000 inhabitants) – This is the total number of telephone lines connected to 
consumer telephone sets; lines are counted whether they are in operation or not.   31 
Table 10. Infrastructure development index, 1970-2000 
País 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Média (I2000-I1970)
Argentina 0,0661 0,0694 0,0861 0,0989 0,1236 0,1822 0,1044 0,1161
Austrália 0,2268 0,2839 0,3238 0,3974 0,4706 0,5242 0,5654 0,3989 0,3387
Áustria 0,1679 0,2301 0,2769 0,3490 0,4059 0,4499 0,4819 0,3374 0,3139
Bélgica 0,1595 0,2146 0,2560 0,3070 0,3819 0,4507 0,5065 0,3252 0,3470
Bolívia 0,0226 0,0236 0,0237 0,0294 0,0475 0,0294 0,0249
Brasil 0,0272 0,0402 0,0578 0,0701 0,0848 0,1300 0,0683 0,1029
Chile 0,0355 0,0396 0,0471 0,0608 0,1079 0,1844 0,0792 0,1490
Colômbia 0,0336 0,0387 0,0492 0,0642 0,0810 0,1275 0,0657 0,0939
Costa Rica 0,0433 0,0565 0,0756 0,0853 0,1126 0,1727 0,0910 0,1294
Dinamarca 0,2597 0,3130 0,3740 0,4294 0,4943 0,5599 0,6371 0,4382 0,3774
República Dominicana 0,0233 0,0246 0,0347 0,0609 0,0839 0,0455 0,0606
Ecuador 0,0206 0,0247 0,0299 0,0384 0,0513 0,0738 0,0398 0,0533
Egito 0,0105 0,0126 0,0191 0,0314 0,0437 0,0667 0,0307 0,0562
El Salvador 0,0121 0,0154 0,0178 0,0219 0,0350 0,0631 0,0275 0,0510
Finlândia 0,2245 0,3124 0,3806 0,4709 0,5629 0,6221 0,6545 0,4611 0,4300
França 0,1140 0,1628 0,2436 0,3776 0,4660 0,5437 0,5852 0,3561 0,4711
Gana 0,0085 0,0092 0,0067 0,0074 0,0080 0,0101 0,0083 0,0015
Grécia 0,0935 0,1685 0,1972 0,2491 0,3222 0,4010 0,4625 0,2706 0,3690
Guatemala 0,0078 0,0110 0,0131 0,0162 0,0225 0,0406 0,0185 0,0329
Honduras 0,0063 0,0078 0,0111 0,0167 0,0231 0,0379 0,0172 0,0316
Hong Kong 0,1697 0,2061 0,2736 0,3750 0,4681 0,4972 0,3316 0,3275
Índia 0,0030 0,0038 0,0053 0,0080 0,0131 0,0248 0,0097 0,0218
Indonésia 0,0004 0,0009 0,0026 0,0052 0,0116 0,0254 0,0077 0,0249
Irlanda 0,0933 0,1188 0,1441 0,1867 0,2461 0,3252 0,4126 0,2181 0,3192
Itália 0,1269 0,1753 0,2064 0,2595 0,3228 0,3814 0,4138 0,2694 0,2869
Jamaica 0,0336 0,0341 0,0355 0,0409 0,0893 0,1736 0,0678 0,1400
Japão 0,1777 0,2893 0,3248 0,3573 0,4151 0,4833 0,5479 0,3708 0,3702
Coréia do Sul 0,0311 0,0523 0,1106 0,2156 0,3377 0,4216 0,1948 0,3906
Malásia 0,0175 0,0260 0,0498 0,0747 0,1266 0,1924 0,0812 0,1748
México 0,0330 0,0415 0,0538 0,0650 0,0885 0,1118 0,0656 0,0788
Holanda 0,1809 0,2514 0,3044 0,3576 0,4082 0,4597 0,5307 0,3561 0,3499
Nova Zelândia 0,3093 0,3571 0,3859 0,4296 0,4776 0,5074 0,5435 0,4301 0,2342
Nicarágua 0,0123 0,0140 0,0139 0,0148 0,0184 0,0280 0,0169 0,0157
Noruega 0,4175 0,5246 0,5642 0,7223 0,8336 0,8975 0,8853 0,6921 0,4678
Paquistão 0,0033 0,0041 0,0058 0,0091 0,0157 0,0226 0,0101 0,0193
Panamá 0,0625 0,0728 0,0832 0,0987 0,1339 0,0902 0,0714
Paragüai 0,0110 0,0128 0,0207 0,1108 0,1553 0,2135 0,0874 0,2025
Peru 0,0194 0,0212 0,0242 0,0283 0,0344 0,0592 0,0311 0,0398
Filipinas 0,0096 0,0111 0,0130 0,0135 0,0172 0,0335 0,0163 0,0239
Portugal 0,0614 0,0862 0,0988 0,1258 0,1862 0,2953 0,3718 0,1751 0,3104
África do Sul 0,0878 0,0965 0,1242 0,1442 0,1561 0,1746 0,1306 0,0868
Espanha 0,0912 0,1386 0,1719 0,2182 0,2727 0,3410 0,3894 0,2319 0,2982
Suécia 0,4672 0,5580 0,6123 0,6975 0,8003 0,8084 0,8163 0,6800 0,3491
Suiça 0,3291 0,4061 0,4360 0,5005 0,5573 0,6088 0,6661 0,5006 0,3370
Síria 0,0163 0,0211 0,0395 0,0447 0,0526 0,0905 0,0441 0,0742
Tailândia 0,0066 0,0089 0,0133 0,0247 0,0500 0,0880 0,0319 0,0814
Tunísia 0,0118 0,0161 0,0248 0,0350 0,0492 0,0748 0,0353 0,0629
Grã-Bretanha 0,2032 0,2607 0,3038 0,3497 0,4019 0,4484 0,5178 0,3551 0,3146
Estados Unidos 0,3929 0,4450 0,4811 0,5421 0,5992 0,6648 0,7397 0,5521 0,3468
Urugüai 0,0635 0,0719 0,1009 0,1255 0,1676 0,2237 0,1255 0,1602
Venezuela 0,0551 0,0688 0,0934 0,1114 0,1322 0,1453 0,1010 0,0901
Média 0,2156 0,1282 0,1418 0,1739 0,2103 0,2478 0,2879 0,1867
Desvio Padrão 0,1190 0,1504 0,1643 0,1942 0,2224 0,2399 0,2468 0,1872  
Source: World Development Indicators 2002. Authors’ calculations.  